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Corporate credit spreads are large, volatile, countercyclical, and significantly larger than expected
losses, but existing macroeconomic models with financial frictions fail to reproduce these patterns,
because they imply small and constant aggregate risk premia. Building on the idea that corporate debt,
while safe in normal times, is exposed to the risk of economic depression, this paper embeds a trade-off
theory of capital structure into a real business cycle model with a small, time-varying risk of large
economic disaster. This simple feature generates large, volatile and countercyclical credit spreads
as well as novel business cycle implications. In particular, financial frictions substantially amplify








The large widening of credit spreads during the recent crisis has drawn attention to their important
allocative role: for many large corporations, the bond market is the “marginal source of ﬁnance”.
Macroeconomic models such as Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) emphasize the role of
credit spreads: as a ﬁrm’s net worth falls, its probability of default rises and the credit spread
increases, leading to a decline of capital expenditures. The importance of this ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism is underscored by some recent estimation exercises.1 However, this model, like most
macroeconomic models with ﬁnancial frictions, is at odds with several well-documented patterns
of credit spreads, known as the “credit spread puzzle” in the empirical ﬁnance literature.2 In the
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist model, the average return on a portfolio of corporate bonds is
essentially the risk-free rate, because aggregate risk premia are small. Equivalently, the credit
spread corresponds exactly to the probability of default. In contrast, in the data the probability
of default of an investment grade bond is much smaller than the spreads: the probability is about
0.4% per year (and there is substantial recovery upon default, around 50%), but spreads average
around 100bp.3 These large spreads suggest the importance of a large, potentially time-varying
risk premium. These spreads are moreover quite volatile, with a standard deviation around 40bp
per year, and they are countercyclical. While the level of spreads was particularly elevated during
the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the cyclicality of spreads is a recurring feature of U.S. business cycles.45
This paper studies the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions in a model that reproduces the key features
of credit spreads. By their very nature, corporate bonds are sensitive to the risk of large economic
recessions. Building on this idea, I embed a simple trade-oﬀ model of capital structure, where
the choice of defaultable debt is driven by taxes and bankruptcy costs, into a real business cycle
(RBC) model, and assume that there is a small, exogenously time-varying risk of large economic
disaster, following the work of Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), Gabaix (2007), and Gourio (2010).
The risk of disaster captures the possibility of a large recession such as the Great Depression.6
1See Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2009), and Gilchrist, Ortiz and Zakrajek (2009).
2See Huang and Huang (2003), Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006), Chen (2008), Chen, Collin-Dufresne and
Goldstein (2009), among others.
3This is the spread of a BAA-rated corporate bond over a AAA-rated corporate bond (rather than a Treasury),
so as to net out diﬀerences in liquidity.
4Philippon (2008), Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajek (2009), Mueller (2009), among others, show that credit
spreads are highly correlated with, and forecast, investment and output.
5Some researchers argue that the variation in credit spreads during the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis is driven by the
deteriorating balance sheets of banks and other ﬁnancial institutions, who may be the marginal investors in these
markets. However, corporate bonds are not exotic assets: any household can buy directly a mutual fund or an
ETF of corporate bonds.
6The probability of economic disaster can be interpreted either as a rational, objective belief, but an alternative
1The capital structure choice modiﬁes the standard RBC model equilibrium in two ways. First,
the standard Euler equation is adjusted to reﬂect that investment is ﬁnanced using both debt and
equity, and the user cost of capital hence takes into account expected discounted bankruptcy costs
as well as the tax savings generated by debt ﬁnance. Second, an additional equation determines
the optimal leverage choice, by equating the marginal expected discounted (tax) beneﬁts and
(bankruptcy) costs of debt. The model remains highly tractable and intuitive, which allows to
evaluate the role of defaultable debt and leverage choice on quantities and prices in a transparent
fashion. In particular, the model encompasses the standard real business cycle model as a special
(limiting) case.
The ﬁrst result is that time-varying disaster risk generates large, volatile and countercyclical
credit spreads, which are signiﬁcantly larger than default probabilities. The second main result
is that ﬁnancial frictions amplify substantially — by a factor of about three — the response of
the economy to a shock to the disaster probability. Consistent with the extant literature, this
ampliﬁcation eﬀect does not arise if the economy is subjected to TFP shocks. Hence, it is
the interaction between the trade-oﬀ model, a staple of corporate ﬁnance, and time-varying
disaster risk which generates novel, quantitatively appealing implications for both asset prices
and quantities.
The key mechanism is as follows. When the probability of economic disaster exogenously in-
creases, the probability of default rises (holding constant the leverage policy). A higher probability
of default directly raises expected discounted bankruptcy costs. However, expected discounted
bankruptcy costs also rise through a second channel: agents anticipate that defaults are now
more systematic, i.e. more likely to be triggered by a bad aggregate shock rather than a bad
idiosyncratic shock. This higher systematic default risk increases the risk premium on corporate
debt, making it more expensive ex-ante to raise funds for investment. Overall, higher expected
discounted bankruptcy costs increase the user cost of capital, leading to a reduction in investment.
In equilibrium, ﬁrms also cut back on debt and substitute for equity, but since debt is cheaper
due to the tax advantage, the user cost of capital has to rise. To sum up, higher disaster risk
worsens ﬁnancial frictions because debt is not eﬃcient when disaster risk is high.
The model has several implications. First, eliminating the deductibility of interest expenses
from taxable corporate income leads to a reduction in macroeconomic volatility and hence to
“behavioral” interpretation is that the probability of disaster reﬂects time-varying pessimism. This simple modeling
device captures the idea that aggregate uncertainty is sometimes high, and that some asset price changes are not
obviously related to current or future productivity, i.e. “bubbles”, “animal spirits”.
2signiﬁcant welfare gains. Second, making debt payments contingent on disaster realizations (as
has been recently suggested by several commentators) reduces volatility substantially: this simple
change eliminates the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions. Third, a high level outstanding
debt makes the economy more fragile, as any negative shock is likely to lead a signiﬁcant share
of ﬁrms into default, which is ineﬃcient. A consequence is that a low perceived risk of economic
disaster, which leads to higher leverage, makes the economy less resilient to shocks — consistent
with a widely held view regarding the recent recession.
In contrast to most of the literature, which focuses on small entrepreneurial ﬁrms which cannot
raise equity easily and rely on bank ﬁnancing, this model is designed to capture the richer margins
that large US corporations use to raise capital. In my model, ﬁr m sa l w a y sp a yd i v i d e n d s( u n l e s s
they default), and no borrowing constraint binds. The relative attractiveness of debt and equity
ﬁnance varies over time, leading to variation in the user cost of capital. My model thus is not
subject to a standard critique of ﬁnancial frictions models, that most ﬁrms do pay dividends and
are “thus” unconstrained. Nor does my model rely on a signiﬁcant heterogeneity between small,
productive, constrained ﬁrms on the one hand, and large, unproductive, unconstrained ﬁrms on
the other hand. Incorporating these realistic elements would of course be interesting, but it is
not required. This suggests that the model mechanism is quite robust. My model is also at least
qualitatively consistent with several stylized facts on the correlation of corporate defaults: ﬁrst,
the “excess clustering” documented byDas et al. (2007), and second the signiﬁcant probability
of large default losses on portfolios of corporate bonds estimated by Duﬃe et al. (2009). Last,
it is important to note that while many ﬁrms do not access the corporate bond market directly
and instead rely on bank loans, a signiﬁcant fraction of these loans are securitized (e.g. through
CLOs) and hence trade on a market that is similar to the corporate bond market.
Organization of the paper
The rest of the introduction discusses the related literature. Section 2 sets up the model. Sec-
tion 3 studies its quantitative implications. Section 4 considers some implications and extensions
of the baseline model. Section 5 concludes. An online appendix provides additional robustness
results and details the numerical method.
Related literature
This paper is related to four diﬀerent branches of literature. First, the paper draws from the
recent literature on “disasters” or rare events (Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), Gabaix (2007), Wachter
(2008), and the criticisms of Julliard and Ghosh (2008) and Backus, Chernov and Martin (2009)).
In particular, the model is a direct, but signiﬁcant, extension of Gourio (2010), who studied a
3frictionless real business cycle model with time-varying disaster risk.
Second, the paper builds on the large macroeconomic literature studying general equilibrium
business cycle models with ﬁnancing constraints (Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997)). Some recent studies in this vein are Chugh (2010), Gomes and Schmid (2008),
Jermann and Quadrini (2008), Mendoza (2010), Miao and Wang (2010), and Liu, Wang and
Zha (2009). In contrast to many studies such as Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) that
completely shut down equity ﬁnancing and focus on the accumulation of internal funds, in my
model ﬁrms are able to raise equity costlessly. (Amdur (2010), Covas and Den Haan (2009), and
Hennessy and Levy (2007) also study the business cycle behavior of capital structure.) Several
of these papers analyze linearized DSGE models, where asset prices are much less volatile than
in the data, and aggregate risk premia are small and nearly constant. Because the economic
mechanism of these models often features asset prices, it seems important to examine the eﬀect
of ﬁnancial frictions in a model where asset prices more closely mimic the data.
Third, the paper considers the real eﬀects of a particular shock to uncertainty (a change in
the probability of disaster). The negative eﬀect of uncertainty on output has been studied most
recently by Bloom (2009), who emphasizes the “wait-and-see” eﬀect driven by lumpy hiring and
investment behavior. My model focuses on changes in aggregate uncertainty and the mechanism
is diﬀerent: desired investment falls through a general equilibrium eﬀect and by exacerbating
ﬁnancial frictions. A related mechanism has recently been explored in the studies of Arellano, Bai
and Kehoe (2010) and Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajek (2010), who consider changes in idiosyncratic
uncertainty as in Bloom (2009), but in a setup with credit frictions. I compare this mechanism
and my mechanism in more detail in section 4.6.
Fourth, the paper relates to the vast literature on the “credit spread puzzle” (e.g. Leland
(1994), Huang and Huang (2003), Hackbardt, Miao and Morellec (2006), Chen (2010), Chen,
Collin Dufresne and Goldstein (2009), and Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2009a, 2009b)). As
discussed in the introduction, this literature documents that the prices of corporate bonds are too
low to be accounted for in a risk-neutral model, and considers various risk adjustments, borrowed
either from the long-run risk or the habits literature, to improve the ﬁt of prices. Perhaps
surprisingly, there is, to my knowledge, no model that studies the contribution of disaster risk
to the credit spread puzzle. Moreover, the literature does not consider investment and is not set
in general equilibrium, making it diﬃcult to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of the ﬁnancial
frictions. On the other hand, this literature studies the asset pricing implications in more detail
and incorporates long-term debt.
42M o d e l
I ﬁrst present the household problem, then the ﬁrm problem, and ﬁnally deﬁne the equilibrium
and asset prices.
2.1 Household
The representative household has recursive preferences over consumption and leisure, following

















Here  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) over the consumption-
leisure bundle, and  measures risk aversion towards static gambles over the bundle. When
 = , the model collapses to expected utility. While the additional ﬂexibility of recursive utility
is useful in calibrating the model, the key qualitative results can be obtained with standard CRRA
preferences (See section 4.5).
The household supplies labor in a competitive market, and trades stocks and bonds issued by
the corporate sector.7 The budget constraint reads
 + 

 +  ≤  + −1 + 

−1 ( + ) −  (2)
where  is the real wage, −1 is the quantity of debt issued by the corporate sector in period
 − 1 at price −1, each unit of which is redeemed in period  for , 
 is the quantity of equity
shares,  is the price of equity,  is the dividend, and  is a lump-sum tax. The number of
equity shares 
 is normalized to one. In the absence of default,  =1  but   1 if some bonds
are not repaid in full. The household takes the process of  a sg i v e n ,b u ti ti sd e t e r m i n e di n
equilibrium by default decisions of ﬁrms, as we will see later.
Intertemporal choices are determined by the stochastic discount factor (a.k.a. marginal rate
7It is possible to introduce government bonds as well. If the government ﬁnances this debt using lump-sum
taxes and transfers, Ricardian equivalence holds, and government policy does not aﬀect the equilibrium allocation
and prices.



























I ﬁrst describe the general structure of the ﬁrm problem, then we ﬁll in the details.
2.2.1 Summary
There is a continuum of mass one of perfectly competitive ﬁrms, which are all identical ex-ante
and diﬀer ex-post only in their realization of an idiosyncratic shock. For simplicity, we assume
that ﬁrms live only for two periods. Firms purchase capital at the end of period  in a competitive
market, for use in period  +1 . This investment is ﬁnanced through a mix of equity and debt.
In period  +1 , the aggregate shocks and the idiosyncratic shock are revealed, ﬁrms decide on
employment and production, and then sell back their capital. Two cases arise at this point: (1)
the ﬁrm value is larger than outstanding debt: the debt is then repaid in full and the residual
value goes to shareholders as dividends; or (2) the ﬁrm value is smaller than outstanding debt:
in this case the ﬁrm declares default, equityholders receive nothing, and bondholders capture the
ﬁrm’s value, net of some bankruptcy costs. In all cases, the ﬁrms disappear after production in
period  +1and new ﬁrms are created, which will raise funds and invest in period  +1  and
operate in period  +2 8
The timing assumption clariﬁes the mechanism, because a default realization does not aﬀect
employment, output and proﬁts. Ex-ante however, default risk aﬀects the cost of capital to the
ﬁrm and hence its investment decision. This investment decision in turns aﬀects employment
and output, and in general equilibrium all quantities and prices. In section 4.1, we consider an
extension where default aﬀects employment and production.
8The assumption that ﬁrms live two periods, while obviously unrealistic, leads to substantial simpliﬁcation of
the analysis, which is useful to solve the model but also to clarify its implications. An important direction of
future research is to incoporate long-lived ﬁrms and long-term debt in the model. Based on section 3.1 below, I
conjecture that the model mechanism would still be quantitatively relevant.
6Since ﬁrms are ex-ante identical, they will all make the same choices. Because both production
and ﬁnancing technologies exhibit constant return to scales, the size distribution of ﬁrms is
indeterminate, and has no eﬀect on aggregate outcomes.
2.2.2 Production
All ﬁrms operate the same constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function using





where  is aggregate total factor productivity (TFP),  is the individual ﬁrm capital stock, and
 is labor. Both input and output markets are competitive and frictionless.
2.2.3 Productivity shocks
To model the possibility of large recessions, I assume that the aggregate TFP process in this
economy is driven not only by the usual “small” normally distributed shocks standard in RBC
theory, but also by rare large negative shocks.9 Formally,
log+1 =l o g +  + +1 + +1 log(1 − )
where {+1} is  (01) and +1 is an indicator equal to 1 if a disaster happens, and 0
otherwise. I will also assume that the realization of disaster directly aﬀects the capital stock (see
the next paragraph). The probability of a disaster at time  +1is denoted  This probability
of disaster  f o l l o w si t s e l faM a r k o vc h a i nw i t ht r a n s i t i o nm a t r i x The  aggregate shocks
{+1 +1 +1} are assumed to be independent, conditional on 
2.2.4 Depreciation shocks
Firms decide on investment at time  but the actual quantity of capital that they will have to
operate at time  +1is random, and is aﬀected both by realizations of aggregate disasters +1
as well as an idiosyncratic shock +1.S p e c i ﬁcally, if a ﬁrm  picks 
+1 at time  (where 
9For parsimony and tractability, these rare disasters are modeled as one-time permanent jump in TFP; Gourio
(2011) considers various extensions and shows that the key results are largely unaﬀected if disasters are modeled
as smaller shocks that are persistent, and are followed by recoveries, provided that risk aversion is increased
somewhat.
7stands for wish), it actually has +1 = 
+1(1 − +1)+1 to operate in period  +1  and
(1−)+1 units of capital to resell. The idiosyncratic shock +1 is  across ﬁrms and across
time, and drawn from a cumulative distribution function ,w i t hm e a nu n i t y .
2.2.5 Discussion of the assumptions regarding disasters
Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursua (2008) identify numerous large negative macroeconomic shocks
in a cross-section of countries, which are usually caused by wars or economic depressions. In a
standard neoclassical model there are two simple ways to model macroeconomic disasters — as
destruction of the capital stock, or as a reduction in total factor productivity. My formulation
allows for both.
TFP appears to play an important role during economic depressions (Kehoe and Prescott,
2007). While economists do not understand well the sources of ﬂuctuations in total factor pro-
ductivity, large and persistent declines in TFP may be linked to poor government policies, such
as expropriation, conﬁscatory taxes, or trade policies. They may also be caused by disruptions
in ﬁnancial intermediation, if these lead to ineﬃcient capital allocation.
Capital destruction is clearly realistic for wars or natural disasters, but it can also be inter-
preted more broadly. Perhaps it is not the physical capital but the intangible capital (customer
and employee value) that is destroyed during prolonged economic depressions.
At the heart, the model mechanism requires two ingredients: (1) that disasters are clearly bad
events, with high marginal utility of consumption; (2) that the return on capital is low during
disasters. These assumptions are certainly realistic. Introducing a large TFP shock is the simplest
way to obtain (1) in a neoclassical model, and introducing a depreciation shock is the simplest
way to obtain (2). An alternative to depreciation shocks is to introduce steep adjustment costs:
since investment falls signiﬁcantly during disasters, the price of capital would also fall, generating
endogenously a low return on capital during disasters.
2.2.6 Capital structure choice
The choice of equity versus debt is driven by a standard trade-oﬀ between default (bankruptcy)
costs and the tax advantage of debt. Speciﬁcally, I assume that bondholders recover a fraction 
of the ﬁrm value upon default, where 0 1.M o r e o v e r ,aﬁrm which issues debt at a price
 receives  where 1 That is, for each dollar that the ﬁrm raises in the bond market, the
government gives a subsidy −1 dollar. For simplicity, I assume that the subsidy takes place at
8issuance.10
The bond price  is determined at time of issuance, taking into account default risk, and hence
depends on the ﬁrm’s choice of debt and capital as well as the economy’s state variables. Equity
issuance is assumed to be costless. When  =  =1  the capital structure is indeterminate and
the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds. When  =1 ,t h eﬁrm ﬁnances only throughe q u i t y ,s i n c e
debt has no advantage. As a result, there is no default, and we obtain the standard RBC model.
When  =1 , or more generally  ≥ 1,t h eﬁrm ﬁnances only through debt, since default is not
costly enough. I will assume   1, a necessary assumption to generate an interior choice for
the capital structure.
2.2.7 Employment, Output, Proﬁts, and Firm Value
To solve the optimal ﬁnancing choice, we ﬁrst need to determine the proﬁts and the ﬁrm value.
(The distribution of ﬁrm value determines the probability of default and hence the lending terms
the ﬁrm can obtain ex-ante.) The labor choice is determined through static proﬁt maximization,
given the realized values of both productivity and capital stock, and given the aggregate wage:































These equations can then be aggregated. Deﬁne aggregates through  =
R 1
0   =
R 1
0 
etc., we obtain that  = 
 ()1− i.e. an aggregate production function exists, and it has
exactly the same shape as the microeconomic production function. Aggregating equation (5)
shows that the wage satisﬁes the usual condition  =( 1− ) 
. The law of motion for capital
is obtained by summing over  the equation +1 = 
+1(1 − +1)+1 Since all ﬁrms are
identical ex-ante, and they will make the same investment choice 
+1 = 
+1,a n ds i n c e+1
10In reality, interest on corporate debt is deductible from the corporate income tax, hence the implicit subsidy
takes place when ﬁrms’ earnings are taxed.




Proﬁts at time  +1are given by











i.e. each ﬁrm receives factor payments proportional to the quantity of capital it has, and to the
aggregate marginal product of capital 
+1
+1. The total ﬁrm value at the end of the period is
+1 = +1 +( 1− )+1 = +1
µ





Deﬁne the aggregate return on capital as 
+1 =( 1− +1)
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return on capital is 
+1 = +1










>From ease of notation, I will from now on abstract from the ﬁrm subscript  since all ﬁrms are
identical and diﬀer only ex-post in their realization of 
2.2.8 Investment and Financing Decisions
All ﬁrms make the same choices for capital, debt, and hence equity issuance, which are linked
through the budget constraint +1 +  = 
+1 To ﬁnd the optimal choice of investment
and ﬁnancing, we ﬁrst need to ﬁnd the likelihood of default, and the loss-upon-default, for any
possible choice of investment and ﬁnancing. This determines the price of corporate debt. Taking
as given this bond price schedule, the ﬁrm can then decide on optimal investment and ﬁnancing.
More precisely, the ﬁrm will default if its realized value +1, which is the sum of proﬁts and
the proceeds from the sale of undepreciated capital, is too low to repay the debt +1. This will
occur if the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic shock  is smaller than a cutoﬀ value, which itself depends on the
realization of aggregate states (+1 +1 +1). Mathematically, at time  +1  the value of ﬁrms
10which ﬁnish operating is +1 = +1
+1









If a disaster is realized (+1 =1 ), the return on capital is lower and the default threshold ∗
+1
is higher, and more ﬁrms default. Given this default rule, the bond issue is priced ex-ante using




















In this equation, the ﬁrst integral gives the value of the debt in the full repayment states. These
states depend on the realization of shocks occurring at time +1 notably disasters, through the
threshold for default ∗
+1. The second term gives the average recovery in default states, divided

























0 () Note the following properties of Ω, which follow from the fact that 
is a c.d.f. with mean unity: (i) Ω()=1−
R ∞
 (); (ii) lim→∞ Ω()=1 ;(iii) Ω0()=()
We can now set up the ﬁrm’s problem at time  : it must decide how much to invest, how
much debt to issue (and hence how much of the investment is ﬁnanced through equity), so as to




 (+1 max(+1 − +10)) −  (8)
subject to:








Equation (9) is the funding constraint: investment must come out of equity  or the sale of
bonds (including the subsidy) +1 The objective function (8) takes into account the option
of default for equityholders. Given that the ﬁrm defaults if +1  ∗











































second term (which is negative since   1) is expected discounted bankruptcy costs; and the
third term is the expected discounted tax shield. The last term 
+1 is simply the cost of invest-








+1. The diﬀerence is that the ﬁrm also takes into account the value of tax subsidies and default
costs in making its decisions. Default costs are born by debt holders ex-post, but expected default
costs are passed on into debt prices ex-ante, implying that equity holders actually bear the costs
of default.
T os o l v et h i sp r o g r a m ,w es i m p l yt a k et h eﬁrst-order conditions with respect to 
+1 and








1+(  − 1)Ω(
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+1 =( 1 − +1)
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is the familiar expression for the unlevered
physical return on capital, adjusted to reﬂect the possibility of disasters. In a model without





=1 ; here, equation (12)
is modiﬁed to take into account the bankruptcy costs (the second term), which raise the cost of
capital, and the tax shield (the third term), which reduces it. When  =  =1 ,w er e t u r nt ot h e
standard equation, corresponding to the case of an unlevered ﬁrm. Overall the ﬁrm has always
access to cheaper ﬁnancing than in the frictionless (all-equity ﬁnanced) model, since it always has
the possibility to not take any debt. As a result, the steady-state capital stock is always higher
when 1 than in the frictionless version.




























12This equation determines the optimal ﬁnancing choice between debt and equity.11 The left-hand
side is the marginal cost of debt, i.e. an extra dollar of debt will increase the likelihood of default,
and the associated bankruptcy costs. The right-hand side is the marginal beneﬁt of debt, i.e. the
higher tax shield in non-default states. Importantly, both the marginal cost and the marginal
beneﬁt are discounted using the stochastic discount factor +1.T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h i s r i s k -
adjustment is consistent with the empirical work by Almeida and Philippon (2007), who note
that corporate defaults are more frequent in “bad times” and as a result the ex-ante marginal
cost of debt is higher than a risk-neutral calculation would suggest. This risk-adjustment will
play a substantial role in the analysis below: for a given debt level, an increase in the probability
of disaster increases expected discounted default costs, not only because defaults become more
likely, but also because they are more likely to occur during bad aggregate times.
Deﬁne desired leverage +1 = +1
+1 which is decided at time  The ﬁrm defaults if

+1  +1 i.e. if the return on capital is low relative to the leverage.
2.3 Equilibrium








Second, the goods market clears, i.e. total consumption plus investment plus bankruptcy costs
equals output,
 +  +( 1− )Ω(
∗
) =  (15)
This equation implies that a wave of defauls leads to large bankruptcy costs and induces a negative
wealth eﬀect. In order to clarify the mechanism, I initially abstract from this eﬀect, by assuming
that the default cost is a tax, i.e. it is transferred to the government, which then rebates it to
household using lump-sum transfers ( in equation 2). Then, the resource constraint is simply
 +  =  (16)
11A second order condition is required to ensure that this condition is suﬃcient. Some regularity condition must
be imposed on the distribution  e.g. the function  →
()
1−() is increasing. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) make the same assumption in the context of a related model. Most distributions (such as the log-normal
distribution) satisfy this assumption.
13Under this simpliﬁcation, equations (12) and (13) are the only departures of our model from
the standard real business cycle model: ﬁrst, the Euler equation needs to be adjusted to reﬂect
the tax shield and bankruptcy costs; second, the optimal leverage is determined by the trade-oﬀ
b e t w e e nc o s t sa n db e n e ﬁts of debt ﬁnance. To summarize, the equilibrium is characterized by the
equations (14), (16), as well as (12) and (13) and the deﬁnition of the stochastic discount factor
(1) and (3).
2.3.1 Recursive Representation
It is useful, both for conceptual clarity and to implement a numerical algorithm, to present a
recursive formulation of this equilibrium. This can be done in three steps. First, make the
simplifying assumption that the bankruptcy cost is a tax, instead a of a real resource cost. Second,
note that the equilibrium can be entirely characterized from time  onwards given the values of
the realized aggregate capital stock  the probability of disaster  and the level of total factor
productivity , i.e. these are the three state variables.12 Hence, the model has the same states as
the frictionless real business cycle (RBC) model. Third, examination of the ﬁrst-order conditions
shows that they can be rewritten solely as a function of the detrended capital  =  and 
This is a standard simpliﬁcation in the stochastic growth model when technology follows a unit
root, which also applies to our framework.
As a result the equilibrium policy functions can be expressed as functions of two state variables
only,  and . Compared to the standard RBC model, we have an additional equilibrium policy
function to solve for, the desired leverage () and correspondingly, we have an additional ﬁrst-
order condition (equation (13)). Last, the ﬁrst-order condition determining optimal investment,
i.e. the standard Euler equation (equation 12)), is modiﬁed to take into account the marginal
ﬁnancing costs. The full list of equations of this recursive representation is in appendix.
2.3.2 Asset Prices
Any payoﬀ can be priced using the stochastic discount factor, given by the representative agent’s
marginal rate of substitution. I focus here on four assets: a pure risk-free asset, a short-term
government bond which may default during disasters, the corporate bond, and the equity. All
12The level of outstanding debt  at the beginning of period is not a state variable, since it does not aﬀect
production or investment possibilities. It does aﬀect default, but because defaults do not aﬀect production, and
bankruptcy costs are not in the resource constraint, the realization of default does not matter in itself — what
matters is the possibility of default going forward. Here we rely on two assumptions: (1) the default cost is a tax;
(2) default takes place after production.
14these assets last only one period. The price of the risk-free asset can be calculated as the
expectation of the stochastic discount factor, 

 =  (+1) Following Barro (2006), the
government bond is assumed to default by a factor ∆ during disasters, and hence its price is


 =  (+1 (1 − +1∆)) The payoﬀ to a diversiﬁed portfolio of corporate bonds, used in



















and the corporate bond price is 






































3Q u a n t i t a t i v e r e s u l t s
This section studies the implications of the model presented in the previous section. First, I
present a combination of analytical results and comparative statics to illustrate the workings of
the model. Then, a parametrized version of the model is solved numerically so as to delineate
its predictions for business cycle quantities, for asset returns, an in particular for the level and
volatility of credit spreads, and their relation with investment and GDP.13
3.1 Steady-state comparative statics
To better understand the model, it is useful to perform a “steady-state” analysis, as is commonly
done in macroeconomics, but one that takes into account the risk of disaster. The ﬁrst step is
the following result.
Proposition 1 Assume that  =  i.e. capital and productivity fall by the same factor in a
disaster Then, a disaster leads consumption, investment, output to also drop by the same factor
 =  while hours do not change. The return on physical capital is reduced by the same factor.
There is no further eﬀect of the disaster on quantities or prices, i.e. all the eﬀect is on impact.
13Given the nonlinear form of the model, and the focus on risk premia, it is important to use a nonlinear solution
method. The policy functions ()()() and () are approximated using Chebychev polynomials
and solved for using projection methods. The appendix details the computational method.
15Proof. The equilibrium is characterized by the policy functions ()()()()
and ()=()1− which express the solution as a function of the probability of disaster
 (the exogenous state variable) and the detrended capital  (the endogenous state variable). The
detrended capital evolves according to the shocks 0 0 0 through

0 =
(1 − 0)((1 − ) + ())
(1 − 0)+0 
Since  = 

0 =
((1 − ) + ())
+0 
is independent of the realization of disaster 0 As a result, the realization of a disaster does
not aﬀect  since  is unchanged, and hence it leads consumption  =  investment
 =  and output  =  to drop, like  by a factor  =  on impact. Furthermore,
once the disaster has hit, it has no further eﬀect since all the endogenous dynamics are captured









To obtain further results, we consider a simpliﬁed version of the model, where we shut down
the shocks to the probability of disaster and the TFP shocks +1. As a result, the only source
of shocks are disaster realizations, which makes it possible to solve for the path of quantities and
returns.
Proposition 2 Assume that  =  that  =0  and that  =  The economy has a balanced
growth path where     , the risk-free rate, the expected return on capital, and the
probability of default, and the credit spread are constant, equal to ∗ ∗ ∗ etc. Along this balanced
growth path, the level of capital, consumption, investment and output     are obtained
by multiplying ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ by  which is evolves as +1 = ++1 log(1−)
Proof. Given that  =0  and  is constant, we can conjecture an equilibrium of the form
described in proposition, and it is easy to check that it satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions. Along
this balanced growth path,  is constant since it is unaﬀected by disaster realizations; the policy
functions ()()()() then imply that these variables are also constant if  = ∗ Given
this, consumption growth and other variables are iid, implying that expected returns and credit
spreads are constant.
A graphical illustration of this result, is that macroeconomic quantities simply grow along
constant trends, without any shocks except for occasional large downward jumps. During these
16jumps, realized returns on bonds and equity are low, but the dynamics of quantities are unaﬀected.








and the economy’s steady-state capital-labor ratio  and leverage  =  are determined
by the two equations:
((1−)−1)
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¢−1 is the standard marginal product of
capital.
While these expressions initially appear complicated, they provide signiﬁcant intuition. First,
note that they are recursive: equation (19) ﬁrst determines the ratio of leverage to the marginal
product 
 and equation (18) then determines the marginal product of capital  and hence 
.14
When there is neither disaster risk nor ﬁnancial frictions, i.e.  =0and  =  =1 ,t h eﬁrst










14Labor supply and the scale of the economy are then determined by preferences in the standard way. First,
note that










and second the MRS = MPL condition implies 1−






.S i n c e
 is known, this is one equation
in one unknown .















Simple algebra shows that a higher probability of disaster  induces to a lower capital stock
provided that the IES is greater than unity: agents are reluctant to invest in the more risky
capital stock. Consider now the case of ﬁnancial frictions but no disaster risk, equation (19)
reﬂects simply the trade-oﬀ between the default costs and tax beneﬁts of leverage:
(1 − )
∗(
∗)=(  − 1)(1 −  (
∗))
Last, in the full model, disaster risk aﬀects the amount of desired leverage for two reasons. First,
it changes the distribution of payoﬀs to the investment. Second, it changes the discount rates
which multiply this distribution of payoﬀs (the term (1 − )
(1−)−1 in equation (19)).
3.1.1 The determinants of optimal leverage and investment
F i g u r e1u s e st h i ss i m p l i ﬁed version of the model to illustrate the eﬀect of several key parame-
ters on the steady-state values of capital, leverage, default probability and credit spreads. Each
column of this ﬁgure corresponds to one parameter; the ﬁr s tc o l u m ns h o w st h ee ﬀect of idiosyn-
cratic volatility . Holding debt policy constant, higher idiosyncratic risk leads to more default
and hence higher credit spreads, increasing the user cost of capital. This leads ﬁrms to reduce
investment. In equilibrium, ﬁrms also endogenously reduce leverage, which mitigates the increase
in default and in credit spreads, but makes ﬁrms rely more heavily on equity issuance, which is
more costly.
The second column shows the eﬀect of the tax subsidy  Ah i g h e r directly reduces the user
cost of capital, since holding debt policy constant, the ﬁrm is able to raise more capital. Second,
ah i g h e r makes debt relatively more attractive than equity, leading ﬁr m st ot a k eo nm o r ed e b t
and increase leverage. This higher leverage leads to a higher probability of default and higher
credit spreads.
Finally, the third column shows the eﬀect of increasing the recovery rate parameter .S i n c e
the expected cost of bankruptcy falls, the user cost of investment falls and investment rises.
Holding debt policy constant, a higher  leads to a lower credit spread, since the recovery value
18is higher. However, since ﬁrms take on more debt, the probability of default and credit spreads
go up.
3.1.2 User cost, ﬁnancial frictions and probability of disaster
Turning now to the eﬀect of the probability of disaster, ﬁgure 2 displays the eﬀect of a rise in 




¢−1,w h i c hi s +  in the standard
neoclassical model. Higher disaster risk leads to a reduction in leverage in equation (19), and
hence an increase in the user cost (adjusted for the tax shield and bankruptcy costs) in equation
(18) and a lower capital-labor ratio. The ﬁgure compares the frictionless model ( =  =1  i.e.
the ﬁrm is only equity-ﬁnanced) and the model with the friction (1). The percentage response
of the steady-state capital stock to a change in the probability of disaster is substantially larger
in the model with the ﬁnancial friction, reﬂecting that the user cost is much more aﬀected by an
increase in disaster risk. An increase in disaster risk in itself increases the probability of default,
but also makes the risk of default more likely to be driven by a bad aggregate realization, hence
increases the cost of debt signiﬁcantly, as reﬂected by the credit spread.15 Overall, the probability
of disaster  has an eﬀect similar to that of , which is the shock considered by Arellano, Bai
and Kehoe (2010) or Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajek (2010) in very recent studies. I return to this
comparison in section III.F.
3.2 Parametrization
Parameters are listed in Table 1. The period is one year. Many parameters follow the business
cycle literature (Cooley and Prescott (1995)). The risk aversion parameter is four, in order to get a
reasonable level for the equity premium. Note that this is the risk aversion over the consumption-
hours bundle. Since the share of consumption in the utility index is .3, the eﬀective risk aversion
to a consumption gamble is 133 (Swanson (2010)), a very low number by the standards of the
asset pricing literature.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption (IES) is set at 2. There is a
large debate regarding the value of the IES. Most direct estimates using aggregate data ﬁnd low
numbers (e.g. Hall (1988)), but this view has been challenged by several authors (see among
others Bansal and Yaron (2004), Gruber (2006), Mulligan (2004), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). As
15For high values of the probability of disaster , the credit spread is decreasing in . This counterintuitive result
simply reﬂects that for very high , ﬁrms reduce debt signiﬁcantly to avoid bankruptcy and associated costs.
19emphasized by Bansal and Yaron (2004), a low IES has the counterintuitive eﬀects that higher
expected growth lowers asset prices, and higher uncertainty increases asset prices. Section 4.5
analyzes how the results are aﬀected by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
One crucial element of the calibration is the probability and size of disaster, which follow Barro
(2006, 2009) and Barro and Ursua (2008) closely. The probability of a disaster is 17% p e ry e a ro n
average. For computational simplicity, I summarize the historical distribution of disasters using
a ﬁve-point distributions, with disaster sizes ranging from 15% to 57%.16 While these disaster
sizes may seem very large, they are the ones estimated by Barro and Barro and Ursua (2007) in a
large international panel data set. The results of the paper are largely unchanged if the disaster
size is set to be smaller — e.g., perhaps the US faces smaller disasters than most other countries
— but risk aversion is correspondingly increased.
The second crucial element is the persistence and volatility of movements in this probability
of disaster. I assume that the log of the probability follows an AR(1) process:
log+1 =  log +( 1− )log + +1
where +1 is  (01)17 The parameter  is picked so that the average probability is 017




=1 50 in order to
roughly match the volatility of credit spreads.
As is standard, I use a log-normal distribution for , the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks.
The three remaining parameters determine the leverage choice:  and ,t h ev a r i a n c eo f
idiosyncratic shocks. Following the corporate ﬁnance literature, I set  =0 4, consistent with
estimates of recovery rates in “bad times”. The parameters  and  are then picked to match
a target average probability of default and leverage. The target for the probability of default is
0.5% per year. I also set a target for leverage equal to 0.55. In the data leverage is somewhat
smaller, perhaps 0.45. Targeting a leverage of 0.45 leads to an unrealistically large variance of
idiosyncratic shocks  This likely reﬂects that ﬁr mv a l u e sa r em o r ev o l a t i l ei nt h em o d e lt h a n
in the data. Higher volatility may be driven by ﬁxed costs of production, which are equivalent to
16The data from Barro and Ursua refers to consumption or output, but my model requires to parametrize the
capital and TFP destruction. It would be interesting to gather further evidence on disasters, and measure  and
 directly. This is beyond the scope of this paper. I concentrate on the parsimonious benchmark case  = .
Given this assumption, to match a drop of, say, 25% in consumption, requires exactly a drop of 25% of capital
and  hence the Barro and Ursua distribution of GDP losses leads directly to the distribution of capital and
productivity losses. (Because TFP = 1−, the drop in total factor productivity is smaller than 25%.)
17This equation allows the probability to be greater than one, however I will approximate this process with a
ﬁnite Markov chain, which ensures that 0    1 .
20a higher target for leverage. Alternatively, the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks may exhibit
skewness and/or kurtosis.18
3.3 Impulse response functions
I ﬁrst illustrate the dynamics of the model in response to the three aggregate shocks: the standard
TFP shock, the disaster realization, and a shock to the probability of disaster. I next discuss how
the model ﬁts both quantities and price data.
3.3.1 The eﬀect of a TFP shock
Figure 3 displays the response of quantities and returns to a one standard-deviation shock to
the level of total factor productivity. (For clarity, this picture, as well as the ones following,
assumes that no other shock is realized.) The response of quantities is similar to that of the
standard real business cycle model: investment rises as ﬁrms desire to accumulate more capital,
employment rises because of the higher labor demand, and consumption adjusts gradually, leading
to temporarily high interest rates. The equity return is high on impact, reﬂecting the sensitivity
of ﬁrms’ dividends to TFP shocks due to leverage, but corporate bonds are largely immune to
small TFP shocks - the default and recovery rates are barely aﬀected.19 As a result, the path for
the bond return mirrors that of the risk-free return. There is essentially no change in leverage or
credit spreads, since the trade-oﬀ determining optimal leverage is hardly aﬀected by the slightly
higher TFP.
3.3.2 The eﬀect of a disaster
Figure 4 shows the response of quantities and returns to a disaster which hits at  =5  The
disaster realization leads capital and TFP to fall by the factors  and  respectively. The
calibration assumes that these parameters are equal, and in this simulation,  =  =2 5 % 
As a result, the transitional dynamics are very simple, as seen in the ﬁgure, and as proved in
proposition 1: output, consumption and investment drop on impact by the same factor, and
hours do not change. The return on capital is also -25%, and is divided among equity and debt.
But it is also further reduced by default, which leads to losses since 1 In this simulation,
18The targets are not exactly matched in the full model because the calibration is done using the “steady-state”
version of the model, studied in the previous section.
19The default rate is deﬁned as the share of ﬁrms in default. Because some of the capital is recovered in defaults,
this is not the realized loss for debholders.
21approximately 12% of ﬁrms are in default, the realized equity return is roughly -52% and the
realized bond return is -4.5%. (The returns we compute are the average across all the ﬁrms,
as deﬁned in section 2.3 there are always some ﬁrms with very high idiosyncratic shocks which
do not default.) Figure 4 illustrates that both equity and corporate debt are risky assets, since
their returns are very low precisely in the states (disasters) when marginal utility is high, i.e.
consumption growth is low. Consistent with proposition 1, the ﬁgure conﬁrms that a disaster
does not generate any transitional dynamics in quantities, leverage, credit spreads, interest rates,
or risk premia: a disaster leads to a once-and-for-all shift in steady-states.
3.3.3 The eﬀect of an increase in the probability of a disaster
The important shock in this paper is the shock to the probability of disaster — i.e. an increase
in perceived risk. Figure 5 presents the responses to an unexpected increase in the probability of
disaster at time  =5  The higher risk leads to a sharp reduction in investment. Simultaneously,
the higher risk pushes down the risk-free interest rate, as demand for precautionary savings
increases. This lower interest rate decreases employment through an intertemporal substitution
eﬀect. Hence, output decreases because employment decreases, even though there is no change
in current or future total factor productivity, and even though the capital stock adjusts slowly.
Intuitively, there is less demand for investment and this reduces the need for production.
Consumption increases on impact since households want to invest less in the now more risky
capital. Consumption then falls over time. Qualitatively, these dynamics are similar to that in
the frictionless version, but the quantitative results are quite diﬀerent. To illustrate this clearly,
ﬁgure 6 superimposes the responses to a shock to the probability of disaster for the frictionless
model ( =  =1 ) and for the current model. The response of macro quantities on impact is
approximately three times larger in the model with ﬁnancial frictions.
As argued in section 3.1, the mechanism through which disaster risk aﬀects the economy is
by changing the expected discounted bankruptcy costs. These become signiﬁcantly higher, since
default is (i) more likely and (ii) more likely to occur in “bad times”. This increases the user cost
for a given ﬁnancial policy, leading ﬁrms to cut back on investment. Moreover, ﬁrms also adjust
their ﬁnancial policy, reducing debt and leverage.
Because risk increases, risk premia rise as the economy enters this recession: the diﬀerence
between equity returns and risk-free returns becomes larger, and the spread of corporate bonds
over risk-free bonds also rises (see the bottom panel of ﬁgure 5). This last result is not fully
22general, however. The equilibrium level of credit spreads depends on the endogenous quantity
of debt, or leverage that ﬁrms decide to take on. For certain parameter values, the endogenous
decrease in leverage leads, paradoxically, to lower credit spreads in response to a higher probability
of disaster. However, for the parameter values that we use, ﬁrms do not decide to cut back on
debt too much, and spreads rise with the probability of disaster. The model hence generates the
required negative correlation between credit spreads and investment output. More generally, the
model implies that risk premia are larger in recessions, consistent with the data.
3.4 Business cycle and ﬁnancial statistics
Tables 2, 3 and 4 report standard business cycle and asset return statistics as well as default
rates and leverage ratios.20 To illustrate the role of disaster risk and time-varying disaster risk,
I solve the model with the benchmark parameter values, under diﬀerent assumptions regarding
the structure of shocks: (i) only TFP shocks, (ii) TFP shocks and disasters, but a constant
probability of disaster; (iii) TFP shocks and disasters, with a time-varying risk of disaster. I also
consider three variant of the model: (a) with the ﬁnancial friction, (b) with constant leverage,
and (c) with no ﬁnancial friction. The benchmark model results (a-iii) are indicated in bold in
these tables. The variant with constant leverage adds the constraint that +1 = 
+1,i . e .
ﬁrms must pick debt and capital so that their ratio is constant (and equal to the average leverage
in the benchmark model).
The models with only TFP shocks (rows 1 through 3) generate a decent match for quantity
dynamics, as is well known from the business cycle literature. This model, however, generates
rather small spreads for corporate bonds, and these spreads simply account for the average default
of corporate bonds, because aggregate risk premia are very small. The spread is 51bp, twice below
the data, whereas the probability of default is 79bp, larger than the data. Moreover, these spreads
are essentially constant. The risk premium for equity is also very small and equity returns are
not volatile. Note that except for investment, which is somewhat less volatile in the model with
ﬁnancial friction, the quantity moments are largely unchanged as we go from row 1 to row 3.
Hence, ﬁnancial frictions do not amplify the response to TFP shocks.21 The smaller volatility of
investment in the model with ﬁnancial frictions is apparently driven by the higher steady-state
20The leverage and default probability data are taken from Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2009). The
other data (GDP, consumption, investment, and credit spreads) are from FRED. I use BAA-AAA as the credit
spread measure, and obtain similar results as Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein. All series are annualized.
21The appendix presents a comparison of the impulse response functions to a TFP shock for the diﬀerent models,
which conﬁrms this result.
23capital stock (as in Santoro and Wei (2010)).
When constant disaster risk is added to the model (rows 4 through 6), the quantity dynamics
are unaﬀected (table 2). Table 3 reveals that credit spreads are signiﬁcantly larger however,
because defaults are much more likely during disasters, when marginal utility is high. The model
generates a higher equity risk premium and a plausible credit spread: the average spread is 129bp,
and the probability of default is 50bp. However, the volatility of spreads is still close to zero.
This motivates turning to the model with time-varying risk of disaster.
Rows 7 through 9 display the results for the models with time-varying disaster risk. The
variation in the disaster risk does indeed lead to volatile credit spreads, roughly in line with the
data. The equity premium is too low, but it is signiﬁcant, and similar to that of the model with
constant probability of disaster. Introducing the time-varying risk of disaster also generates new
quantity dynamics: output and especially investment become more volatile. Moreover, credit
spreads are countercyclical. Overall, the model ﬁts well many stylized facts.
It is noteworthy that the model can generate volatile spreads only when disaster risk is time-
varying. This suggests that variation in aggregate risk is important and plays a role in shaping
business cycles.22
The ampliﬁcation eﬀect of disaster risk shock through ﬁnancial frictions is visible in table
2: while the ﬁnancial friction model exhibits less volatility than the RBC model when disaster
risk is constant, it has more volatility than the RBC model when disaster risk is added. This
is especially true for investment volatility, which nearly doubles as time-varying disaster risk is
introduced.
The model with constant leverage generates even more volatility of quantities. Because ﬁrms
cannot delever easily when the probability of disaster rises, the model generates more movements
in spreads and investment. Finally, the model implies some volatility of leverage, but it falls
somewhat short of the data. However, the one-period nature of ﬁr m si nt h i sm o d e lm a k e si t
diﬃcult to interpret this statistic: the ﬂow and stock of debt are equal in the model, while they
behave diﬀerently in the data (Jermann and Quadrini (2009), Covas and Den Haan (2009)).
It is interesting to quantify the increase in systematic risk that occurs when the disaster prob-
ability rises. Figure 7 presents the correlation of defaults that is expected given the probability
of disaster today, i.e.  (+1+1) for any two ﬁrms  and  in the model economy.
22The key mechanism of the model is time-varying aggregate uncertainty. This time-varying aggregate un-
certainty comes here from a time-varying probability of disaster, but the model implications are similar if the
uncertainty takes the form of normally distributed shocks. If the shocks are small, risk aversion needs to be
correspondingly higher.
24In normal times, the probability of disaster is low, and defaults are largely idiosyncratic since
aggregate TFP shocks do not create much variation in default rates. Hence, this correlation is
low. The correlation becomes much higher, however, when the probability of disaster rises. This
is because defaults are now much more likely to be simultaneously triggered by the realization
of a disaster. This higher correlation would show up in some asset prices such as CDO or CLO
(collateralized debt or loan obligations). This higher correlation stems directly from the increase
in aggregate uncertainty, holding idiosyncratic uncertainty constant. This correlation is aﬀected
by ﬁrms’ choices, however, since they decide on how much debt to take which aﬀects their default
likelihood: for very large , ﬁrms cut back on debt so much that this correlation may fall.
O v e r a l l ,t h em o d e lh a st w om a i nd e ﬁciencies: ﬁrst, the correlation of consumption and output
is too low; second, the equity return is not volatile enough. The latter point is also driven by
the fact that equities are only a one-period asset here, implying that the conditional volatility of
equity returns equals the conditional volatility of dividends (i.e. there is only a cash ﬂow eﬀect
and no discount rate eﬀect).
4 Extensions and Robustness
This section considers some implications and extensions of the baseline model, and the sensitivity
of the quantitative results to parameter changes.
4.1 Default crises and time-varying resilience of the economy
For the purpose of analytical clarity, the benchmark model assumes that default does not aﬀect
output: (i) bankruptcy costs are a tax rather than a real resource cost, and (ii) a ﬁrm in default is
as productive as a ﬁrm in good standing. This section relaxes these two assumptions: (i) in reality,
bankruptcies are costly: costs include legal fees as well as the loss of intangible capital such as
customer goodwill; (ii) ﬁrms in default are likely less productive as they need to reorganize and are
constrained in their relations with suppliers and customers. Relaxing either of these assumptions
implies that an economy with a high level of outstanding debt is prone to “default crises”: any
negative shock may drive many ﬁrms into default, which further degrades the economy. The exact
eﬀect of (i) and (ii) is however diﬀerent: (i) is a pure wealth eﬀect, while (ii) reduces productivity
and hence labor demand. Neither (i) nor (ii) aﬀects the default decision ex-post, since the outside
option of equity holders is zero.
25An important implication of this extension of the model is that the economy’s sensitivity to
shocks (or resilience) is time-varying. For instance, as discussed in the previous section, a low
probability of disaster leads ﬁrms to pick a high leverage. This makes the economy less resilient,
i.e. its investment and output will fall more should a bad shock occur. This is consistent with a
widely held view that during the 2000s, perception of risk fell, leading ﬁrms to increase leverage
and making the 2008 recession worse.
Formally, we make the following two changes to the model. The ﬁr s ti st oa s s u m et h a tas h a r e
 of the bankruptcy costs is a real resource cost. The second is that ﬁrms in default have lower
productivity, by a factor (1 − )















The resource constraint now reads








  = 
We also need to modify consequently the ﬁrm value and bond price equations and the associated
ﬁrst order conditions; these equations are available in the appendix. As a result of this change,
the quantity of debt  is now an additional state variable.
Figure 8 illustrates the negative eﬀect of outstanding debt on the economy for the case  =0 5
and  =0  i.e. ﬁrms in default are more productive. (The appendix presents an examples for
t h ec a s eo f =0and  =0 5, i.e. bankruptcies have real resource costs.) Ceteris paribus, a
larger amount of debt increases default rates, and reduces output, employment, investment and
consumption.
4.2 State-contingent debt
The deﬁning characteristic of debt is that it is not state contingent. In the aftermath of the
2008 ﬁnancial crisis, several economists have proposed that debt should be conditioned on large
aggregate shocks. This section evaluates this proposal by allowing ﬁrms in the model to issue
debt which repayments are contingent on the disaster realization 0
26The model is easily modiﬁed; ﬁrst, the budget constraint now reads,
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+1) is the face value of the debt to be repaid in non-disaster (resp. disaster)
states, and 
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The Euler equation interpretation is similar to that of the benchmark model; the investor takes
into account the total user cost of debt, which now must take into account the diﬀerent leverage
in disaster vs. non-disaster states. The optimal leverage condition simply says that, rather than
equating expected discounted marginal costs and beneﬁts of debt over all the states together,
the ﬁrm can now equate these expected marginal costs and beneﬁts conditional on the disaster
happening or not.T h i s a d d e d ﬂexibility will lead the ﬁr mt oi s s u el i t t l ed e b tt h a ti sp a y a b l e
in disaster states, since bankruptcy is much more likely and costly in these states. As a useful
special case, suppose that there are no TFP shocks or shocks to , then the expectations are just
expectations over the idiosyncratic shocks  and the ﬁrst-order condition states, if we denote
default cutoﬀ in non-disaster states by ∗








































+1(1 − ) Hence, the ﬁrm targets
the  default probability, conditional on a disaster happening, and conditional on no disaster
happening. This implies a much lower face value of debt in disasters.
Figure 9 compares the response of the model with state-contingent debt to an increase in disas-
ter risk, with the response of the benchmark model. The ampliﬁcation eﬀect largely disappears,
and the model implies now no more volatility in investment than the frictionless RBC model.
Hence, while the assumption that private contracts are not made contingent on aggregate real-
izations is made in many models (such as Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) or Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997)), this result suggest that it is far from innocuous. Krishnamurthy (2003) similarly
found that allowing for conditionality reduces or eliminate the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of ﬁnancial
frictions.
The beneﬁts of debt conditionality in reducing volatility in response to shocks to disaster risk,
comes on top of the obvious advantage that, should a disaster happen, there will be fewer defaults,
which are likely to be costly (as in the previous section). This suggests that debt conditionality
is likely valuable, provided that disasters can be well deﬁned in a contract.
4.3 Welfare cost of the tax shield
Following a large literature in corporate ﬁnance, the model features as a prime determinant of
capital structure the tax subsidy to debt, or tax shield. The tax shield is ineﬃcient in the model
for two reasons. First, the tax shield lowers the user cost of capital and hence encourages capital
accumulation. However, the competitive equilibrium of the model without taxes is already Pareto
optimal, hence the subsidy leads to overaccumulation of capital. Second, the tax shield also
ampliﬁes ﬂuctuations in aggregate quantities, including consumption, and hence reduces welfare.
Table 8 illustrates this eﬀect by displaying the volatility of output, investment and employment,
for various values of  Both in terms of steady-states and in terms of ﬂuctuations then, the
tax subsidy generates deadweight losses. A ﬁgure in appendix gives the welfare cost of the tax
subsidy, as a function of . For our benchmark calibration of  =1 062, removing the tax shield
entirely would increase welfare substantially, equivalent to a permanent increase of consumption
of approximately 3.52%.
284.4 Capital adjustment costs
While the benchmark model abstracts from adjustment costs in the interest of simplicity, intro-
ducing them is useful to generate further volatility in the value of capital. In particular, the model
implies that an increase in the probability of disaster has essentially no eﬀect on realized equity
returns or bond returns.23 This implication is overturned if there are adjustment costs, because
the price of capital then falls following an increase in the probability of disaster, since investment
and marginal Q fall. It is simplest to consider an external adjustment cost formulation. Suppose
that capital goods are produced by a competitive investment sector which takes  consumption






capital goods next period. These capital goods are then sold in a competitive market to ﬁnal
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and  = 
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  Following Jermann (1998), I set Φ()=
0 + 1
1−
1− ,w h e r e0 and 1 are picked to make the steady-state investment rate and marginal
Q independent of .
T a b l e s5t h r o u g h7r e p o r tm o d e lm o m e n t sf o rt w ov a l u e so f,a n daﬁgure in appendix
compares the impulse response function of the benchmark model (without adjustment costs) and
the model with adjustment costs ( = 1), when the shock is an increase in the probability of
disaster. As expected, adjustment costs smooth the response of investment and output. The
qualitative dynamics, as well as the asset prices, remain similar. When the probability of disaster
rises, the return on equity is now lower, and the return on the corporate bond is also slightly
lower, reﬂecting the fall in the resale value of capital and the ensuing higher default rate.
4.5 Role of the IES and risk aversion
While the households are assumed to have recursive utility, the model can also be solved in the
special case of expected utility. When the elasticity of substitution is kept equal to 2, and the
risk aversion is lowered to 5 to reach expected utility, the qualitative implications are largely
23Technically, the only eﬀect is through a decrease in the supply for labor which pushes the wage up, leading to
slightly lower proﬁts and hence slightly higher default rates.
29unaﬀected. Tables 5 through 7 report the model moments with this speciﬁcation. Because risk
aversion is lower, all risk premia are lower, and the response of quantities to a probability of
disaster shock is also smaller since agents care less about risk.24
In contrast, when the elasticity of substitution is small, a shock to the probability of disaster
may lead to diﬀerent qualitative eﬀects. When the IES is low enough, investment, output and
employment rise (rather than fall) as the probability of disaster rises. The intuition is that higher
risk makes people save more, despite the fact that the capital is more risky. In the frictionless
model, the threshold value for the IES is exactly unity. In the model of this paper, higher
uncertainty has a more negative eﬀect on investment demand, and hence the threshold value for
the IES is lower than unity. Hence, for a certain range of values of IES below unity, the ﬁnancial
friction model implies that higher disaster risk lowers economic activity, while the frictionless
model implies the opposite — an extreme example of the potential importance of ﬁnancial frictions.
Tables 5 through 7 report the model moments with a low IES (.25), which generates the opposite
comovement. This speciﬁcation is unattractive, since it implies that risk premia are procyclical,
contrary to the data.
4.6 Comparison with idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks
Following Bloom (2009), several recent studies consider the eﬀect of an increase in idiosyncratic
uncertainty,  in our notation. While Bloom (2009) focused on the transmission of this shock
through adjustment costs frictions, Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2009), and Gilchrist, Sim and
Zakrajek (2010) use default risk frictions, similar to my model. The shock to disaster risk is also
an increase in uncertainty, and hence has a qualitatively similar eﬀect. For instance, comparing
ﬁgures 1 and 2 shows that the two parameters  and  have similar eﬀects on steady-states.
However, the channel through which the mechanism operates is somewhat diﬀerent in my model,
because an increase in aggregate uncertainty makes defaults more systematic and hence aﬀects
the bond risk premium.
To illustrate the diﬀerences in the mechanism, we can think of three experiments. First,
the response of the economy to a shock to  is essentially unaﬀected by the coeﬃcient of risk
aversion. In contrast, as shown in section III.E, the response to an increase in disaster risk in
24There is one qualitative change, but it is hard to discern in most statistics. A shock to the probability
of disaster increases consumption, hence with expected utility it is a “good state”, i.e. low marginal utility of
consumption state. This is not the case with Epstein-Zin utility, since the future value is lower, making a high
probability of disaster state a “bad state” (high marginal utility of consumption). This in turn implies that assets
which pay oﬀ well in that state have higher risk premia rather than lower risk premia.
30my model is stronger when risk aversion is larger. Second, in the frictionless version, an increase
in disaster risk leads to a recession, whereas an increase in idiosyncratic risk has no eﬀect on
economic activity.25 Finally, suppose that we consider a shock to disaster risk, such that high
disaster risk states have low idiosyncratic volatility, making the total quantity of risk constant
over time. In essence, we are changing only the relative importance of aggregate and idiosyncratic
risk, and hence the  across ﬁrms. This shock reduces investment and output, if risk
aversion is positive, even though total risk does not change at the microeconomic level. The
appendix produces the impulse responses corresponding to these three experiments.
The aim of this discussion is not to argue that idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks are unim-
portant, but that the channel through which they operate is diﬀerent than the channel through
which aggregate uncertainty shock operate, at least in this model. The two approaches have
diﬀerent strengths: my model connects well with the evidence on the behavior of credit spreads,
correlation risk and aggregate risk premia. In contrast, the studies of Arellano et al. and Gilchrist
et al. focus on more realistic microeconomic heterogeneity, and take into account the eﬀect of
uncertainty on reallocation and on the labor wedge among other issues.
4.7 Samples with disasters
So far the results reported are calculated in samples which do not include disasters. Large
excess returns arise for two reasons: ﬁrst, a standard risk premium; second, a sample selection
(“Peso problem”) since the sample does not include the lowest possible return realizations. To
quantify the importance of the second eﬀect, tables 5 through 7 report the model moments in
the benchmark model if the sample includes disasters. Quantities and returns are of course more
volatile since they include some large realizations. The average excess returns on equities is 1.38%
(vs. 2.30% in a sample without disasters). Similarly, the average return on corporate bonds is
0.44% (vs. 0.60% in a sample without disasters (unreported in tables)). The dynamics of credit
spreads and leverage are completely unaﬀected.
25In some models, an increase in uncertainty would lead to a boom by leading to labor reallocation among ﬁrms
with decreasing return to scale. But in the model of this paper, idiosyncratic shocks literally wash out because of
the combined assumptions of constant return to scale and frictionless labor market.
315C o n c l u s i o n
There are two main contributions. First, the paper embeds the standard capital structure trade-oﬀ
theory, in a tractable equilibrium business cycle model. The trade-oﬀ model is a well established
theory in corporate ﬁnance, and is a promising ﬁnancial friction for macroeconomics, because it
applies to all ﬁrms, large and small, and does not rely on binding borrowing constraints. Second,
the paper studies the reaction of the economy to an increase in disaster risk. Time-varying
disaster risk is essential to replicate the level, volatility and countercyclicality of credit spreads,
and the fact that credit spreads are much larger than expected losses (or expected probabilities
of default). Moreover, the trade-oﬀ friction substantially ampliﬁes, by a factor of about three,
the response of macroeconomic aggregates to disaster risk. The key mechanism is that defaults
are expected to be more systematic, increasing risk-adjusted bankruptcy costs and hence the user
cost of capital.
A natural direction in which to extend the analysis is to consider long-lived ﬁrms which
may issue long-term debt. In the current version, ﬁrms are able to readjust leverage costlessly
each period. In reality, it may be diﬃcult to restructure the debt. This would likely generate
endogenous persistence through ﬁrms’ net worth.
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36Parameter Symbol Value
Capital share  .3
Depreciation rate  .08
Share of consumption in utility  .3
Discount factor  .98
T r e n dg r o w t ho fT F P  .01
Standard deviation of TFP shock  .02
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1 2
Risk aversion  4
Mean probability of disaster .017
Distribution of  =  : values (.15,.25,.35,.45,.57)
Distribution of  =  : probabilities (.333,.267,233,.033,.133)
Persistence of log()  .75





Idiosyncratic shock volatility  0.2267
Tax subsidy  − 1 0.0616
Recovery rate  0.4







(∆log )  
Data 2.78 0.65 2.52 0.96 0.61 0.80
No disaster risk Benchmark 1.80 0.55 1.88 0.33 0.97 0.99
Constant leverage 1.80 0.55 1.89 0.33 0.97 0.99
RBC 1.82 0.56 2.47 0.35 0.96 0.98
Constant Benchmark 1.81 0.55 1.97 0.34 0.96 0.99
Disaster risk Constant leverage 1.81 0.55 1.97 0.34 0.96 0.99
RBC 1.83 0.56 2.50 0.35 0.96 0.98
Time-varying Benchmark 2.11 0.77 3.38 0.83 0.12 0.86
Disaster risk Constant leverage 2.46 0.89 4.62 1.05 -0.23 0.86
RBC 1.86 0.60 2.89 0.46 0.79 0.91
Table 2: Business cycle statistics (annual). Second moments implied by the model, for dif-
ferent versions of the model. The statistics are computed in a sample without disasters. rho(A,B)
is the correlation of the growth rate of time series A and B. The benchmark model is in bold.
37() () (spread) (spread) (Spread,GDP) () ()
Data 0.80 7.60 0.94 0.41 -0.37 2.50 16.20
No disaster risk Benchmark 2.46 2.44 0.51 0.00 -0.56 0.23 0.39
Cst leverage 2.46 2.39 0.55 0.01 0.64 0.23 0.39
RBC 2.59 2.54 -0.01 0.00 0.11 0.27 0.33
Constant Benchmark 1.21 3.84 1.29 0.00 -0.65 0.22 0.41
Disaster risk Cst leverage 1.21 3.81 1.32 0.01 0.65 0.22 0.41
RBC 1.32 2.65 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.26 0.33
Time-varying Benchmark 1.31 3.60 0.98 0.46 -0.53 2.33 1.18
Disaster risk Cst leverage 1.31 3.85 1.21 1.40 -0.80 2.58 1.88
RBC 1.41 2.65 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 2.05 0.34
Table 3: Financial Statistics, 1. Mean and standard deviation of the risk-free return, the
equity return, and the spread between the corporate bonds and the risk-free bond. The statistics
are calculated in a sample without disasters. The correlation is the correlation between the spread
BAA-AAA and HP-ﬁltered GDP.
E(Lev) Std(Lev) E(ProbDef) Std(ProbDef)
Data 0.45 0.09 0.39 NA
No disaster risk Benchmark 0.56 0.00 0.79 0.01
Constant leverage 0.57 0.00 0.86 0.03
RBC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant Benchmark 0.54 0.00 0.50 0.01
Disaster risk Constant leverage 0.55 0.00 0.53 0.02
RBC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time-varying Benchmark 0.54 0.04 0.58 0.23
Disaster risk Constant leverage 0.54 0.00 0.49 0.02
RBC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4: Financial Statistics, 2. Mean and volatility of leverage and of probability of default.








(∆log )  
Data 2.78 0.65 2.52 0.96 0.61 0.61
Benchmark model 2.11 0.77 3.38 0.83 0.12 0.86
Samples with disasters 5.47 1.00 1.58 0.32 0.81 0.80
Adjustment costs ( = 1) 1.75 0.83 2.60 0.62 0.54 0.83
Adjustment costs ( = 2) 1.58 0.90 2.11 0.48 0.73 0.80
IES = .5 1.59 0.78 1.58 0.23 0.96 0.96
IES = .25 1.57 0.94 2.11 0.51 0.70 0.80
Risk aversion = .5 1.97 0.69 2.83 0.67 0.39 0.88
Table 5: Extensions of the model: business cycle statistics (annual).
38() () (spread) (spread) (Spread,GDP) () ()
Data 0.80 7.60 0.94 0.41 -0.37 2.50 16.20
Benchmark model 1.31 3.60 0.98 0.46 -0.53 2.33 1.18
Samples with disasters 1.30 2.68 0.98 0.46 -0.52 2.34 7.05
Adjustment costs ( = 1) 1.31 3.62 0.98 0.46 -0.46 2.17 1.75
Adjustment costs ( = 2) 1.32 3.62 0.98 0.46 -0.37 2.09 2.07
IES = .5 1.61 3.90 0.98 0.47 -0.10 2.36 1.11
IES = .25 1.97 4.27 0.98 0.46 0.21 2.40 1.11
Risk aversion = .5 2.28 3.68 0.77 0.28 -0.63 1.50 0.91
Table 6: Extensions of the model: Financial Statistics, 1.
E(Lev) Std(Lev) E(ProbDef) Std(ProbDef)
Data 0.45 0.09 0.39 0.51
Benchmark model 0.54 0.04 0.58 0.23
Samples with disasters 0.54 0.04 0.81 2.55
Adjustment costs ( = 1) 0.54 0.04 0.58 0.24
Adjustment costs ( = 2) 0.54 0.05 0.58 0.24
IES = .5 0.54 0.04 0.58 0.23
IES = .25 0.54 0.04 0.58 0.23
Risk aversion = .5 0.55 0.03 0.65 0.18






 =1 062 (Benchmark) 2.11 3.38 0.83 0.54
 =1 06 2.11 3.41 0.82 0.54
 =1 05 2.05 3.41 0.77 0.53
 =1 04 2.00 3.37 0.71 0.51
 =1 03 1.96 3.30 0.64 0.50
 =1 02 1.91 3.14 0.57 0.47
 =1 01 1.89 3.00 0.51 0.43
 =1 005 1.87 2.94 0.48 0.39
 =1 002 1.86 2.92 0.47 0.34
 =1 001 1.86 2.91 0.46 0.30
 =1(RBC) 1.86 2.89 0.43 0.00












































































































Figure 1: Comparative statics on steady-state. Eﬀect of idiosyncratic volatility  tax
subsidy  and recovery rate , on capital, leverage, probability of default (in %), and credit
spread (in %).
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Figure 2: Comparative statics on steady-state. Eﬀect of an increase in the probability of
disaster on capital, leverage, credit spreads (in %), and the user cost of capital, for the frictionless
model ( =0 , red dot-dashed line) and the benchmark model (0, blue full line).





































































Figure 3: Impulse response function of model quantities and returns to a one standard
deviation shock to total factor productivity. Quantity responses are shown in % deviation
from balanced growth path. Returns, default rates, credit spreads, leverage and the probability
of disaster are annual, in % per year.














































































Figure 4: Impulse response function of model quantities and returns to a disaster
realization. Quantity responses are shown in % deviation from balanced growth path. Returns,
default rates, credit spreads, leverage and the probability of disaster are annual, in % per year.

















































































Figure 5: Impulse response function of model quantities and returns to a shock to the
probability of disaster. Quantity responses are shown in % deviation from balanced growth
path. Returns, default rates, credit spreads, leverage and the probability of disaster are annual,
in % per year.














































































Figure 6: Comparison of RBC model with and without ﬁnancial friction. This ﬁgure
compares the impulse response of three models to a probability of disaster shock: the benchmark
model (red full line), the model with constant leverage (green dot-dashed line), and the frictionless
RBC model (blue dashed line). Quantity responses are shown in % deviation from balanced
growth path. Returns, default rates, credit spreads, leverage and the probability of disaster are
annual, in % per year.











Figure 7: Time-varying systematic risk: Correlation of defaults in the model. This
picture plots the correlation of default indicator between any two ﬁrms next period, i.e.
(+1 +1) as a function of the disaster probability 
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Figure 8: Eﬀect of outstanding debt on quantities, when ﬁrms in default are less pro-
ductive. The ﬁgure plots the policy functions for consumption, () employment ()
output () investment () the relative productivity of ﬁrms in default relative to ﬁrms
not in default, and the share of ﬁrms in default, as a function of outstanding debt  (holding 
and  ﬁxed).




















































Figure 9: Role of state-contingent debt. The ﬁgure plots the impulse response function of
model quantities to a shock to the probability of disaster. Blue full line = state-contingent debt,
red line = benchmark model, green line = RBC frictionless model. Quantity responses are shown
in % deviation from balanced growth path.
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